Science and man: the degradation of scientific dogma by Urban, Wilbur Marshall, 1873-
THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS O F  
DEMOCRATIC DOGMA’ 
I 
SCIENCE AND MAN: THE DEGRADATION OF 
SCIENTIFIC DOGMA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A 
are doubtless wondering why, in this time of stress You and strain, a philosopher of all men should be asked 
to speak to  you. And you have a right to wonder. If, as the 
ancient Roman dictum has it, inter arma leges silent, even 
more in such times should the philosopher withdraw into 
silence and leave the field to better men. For  this is not the 
time, it will be said, for abstract thought and balanced judg- 
ment, but for emotion and action. 
And yet a strong case can be made out for the opposite. 
If in time of war laws are silent it is just a t  such a time that 
the law should speak most majestically. If in time of war 
unreason is in the saddle it is a t  such a time that man, if he 
is to  remain man and not sink to  the level of the beast, 
should think most about reason and rationality. 
“The philosopher,” wrote William James, “is simply a 
man who thinks a little more stubbornly than other people.” 
I t  is, however, not merely this stubbornness that distin- 
guishes the philosopher but rather what all his stubborn- 
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ness is about. T h e  scientist discovering a new law, the in- 
ventor perfecting a new instrument of beneficence o r  malefi- 
cence-the administrator, the industrialist-all these think 
very hard about many important things. It is for  the philoso- 
pher  to think what these things are  really all about. 
Eternal  vigilance, it is said, is the price of liberty. W i t h  
equal t ruth i t  may be said that  eternal thinking-stubborn 
and pitiless thought-is the price of rationality. T h e r e  are  
certain truths by which men live-dogmas which underlie 
the life of reason in man, concerning which man must think 
constantly i f  he is to  remain rational, i f ,  indeed, he is to  
remain man a t  all. 
B 
This  brings me to  the general subject of these lectures, 
T h e  Logical Foundations of Democratic Dogma, f o r  it is 
about these foundations that  I would have you think. W e  
like to  speak of the democratic way of life-but there is no 
way of life, democratic o r  other,  t ha t  does not  have its 
dogmas-or, as the modern phrase has it, its ideology. 
T h e r e  a re  three truths by which the democratic life is 
lived, whether we know it  or not. T h e r e  is first of all what 
I shall call the scientific dogma-the belief in the primacy of 
reason in the life of man, and in the freedom of man through 
knowledge or science. T h e r e  is, secondly, the political 
dogma-the belief tha t  man, as mart, is a rational being, 
and, as  such, has certain natural  and inalienable rights o r  
claims; and tha t  universal justice-or giving every man his 
due-has absolute value. Finally there is a third dogma with 
which these two are  logically bound up, namely, the belief 
in progress and the development of man. Th i s  is the prin- 
ciple of reason in history-that history is not sound and 
fury signifying nothing but has an  ultimate meaning and an 
end. 
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You may wonder why these things need to  be thought 
about a t  all. Yet every one of these dogmas is now called 
in question, not only by the anti-democratic ideologies with 
which we are familiar, but by so-called democratic thinkers 
themselves. These dogmas, we are  told, belonged to  the 
“old liberalism” of the nineteenth century: the new liberal- 
ism of the twentieth must discard them. Moreover, as we 
shall see, they constitute a logical structure : if they do not 
hang together they will hang separately. I t  is the logical 
foundations of this structure which we have to examine. 
There can be no question, I think, that  the primary and 
most fundamental of these dogmas is the belief in reason 
and science as the foundation of society and of human wel- 
fare and happiness. It is this scientific dogma that  will en- 
gage our attention in this first lecture. 
11. T H E  AGE OF SCIENCE A S  A N  AGE OF UNREASON 
W e  like to think of our age as one of universal intelli- 
gence and enlightenment-in short as an age of reason. In 
reality this very “age of science” is also one of the deepest 
intellectual and spiritual confusion-of fundamental un- 
reason. 
I t  is doubtful if  there has ever been an age in which man 
has understood himself so little, in which he has been so 
knowing and yet so unaware, so burdened with purposes and 
yet a t  bottom so purposeless, so disillusioned and yet feel- 
ing himself so completely the victim of illusion. This  inde- 
cision permeates our entire culture-our industry and our 
a r t ,  our science and our philosophy. Is it strange that these 
clouds of doubt which have hung over Western man so long 
should finally have burst into a storm of unreason such as 
man has never before known ? 
Do you doubt that  these are the characters of our age? 
Wha t  shall we say of an age in which man’s industry has 
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grown ever fiercer and fiercer, while the doubt of the good 
of the economic system under which we are working-even 
of its ability to  survive-becomes ever more and more in- 
sistent? W h a t  shall we say of an epoch in which the means 
of artistic expression become ever more complicated and 
refined only to  leave us haunted by the feeling that there is 
less and less to  express; of an epoch in which science and 
knowledge “grow from more to  more,” while faith in the 
ultimate meaning and value of that knowledge becomes 
weaker and weaker? 
Even the man in the street is dimly aware of these con- 
tradictions in our modern life but much of it he does not 
comprehend. There  is, however, one outstanding fact of the 
present situation which he both understands and dreads. It 
is connected with the thing we call science. 
Science every one knows and thinks he understands. F o r  
the man in the street science means primarily invention. H e  
glories in the tremendous advances in physical science and 
stands in wonder before its machines. H e  glories not only 
in what science can do  with things but what, as he believes, 
it can make of man. Freedom through scientific intelligence 
and invention has been one of the fundamental dogmas of 
the modern epoch. But now he finds this thing called science 
turned to  the destruction of the very culture which produced 
it. H e  cannot help asking whether there is, after all, not 
something inherently vicious, some metaphysical evil, so to  
speak, in the machines themselves. Then  he laughs a t  him- 
self and awakes from his evil dream. It is, he cries, not 
science and the machine that are a t  fault, but the men that 
make them, When we have a satisfactory science of man, 
when we have learned to  control men and society in the way 
we have learned to  control things, all will be well. 
So men thought in the gay nineties; they were gay and 
confident about science as about everything else. So many 
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think, even now, God help them! But the more thoughtful 
have awakened from the dream of the old liberalism and 
realize that it is precisely by such thoughts that mankind 
has thrust itself even deeper in the bog of confusion and 
illusion. Even the man in the street has come to see that 
such science, and such control of man through science, would 
make of man himself a machine, a robot which, precisely 
because he can be thus controlled, is all the more dangerous. 
T h e  shibboleth of social control, the panacea of the last 
decades, has developed into scientific propaganda the full 
significance of which is nowhere yet fully understood. 
These are indeed disturbing thoughts. They  have dis- 
turbed the man in the street, but still more the scientist and 
the philosopher. I t  is highly significant that  ever since the 
present war began precisely this topic, Science and Man,  has 
become a chief subject for discussion in all the leading scien- 
tific societies of Great Britain and America. Only recently 
a symposium was held in New York the results of which 
were embodied in twenty-four essays published under the 
topic Science and M a n .  One thing stands out clearly as the 
result of this discussion-the necessity of a new evaluation 
of science. Differ as they did in many things, all the con- 
tributors agreed on one point as summarized in the Preface : 
“If man’s civilization and welfare is to  be maintained the 
one thing needful is a clearer understanding of the relation 
of science to values; of our human values themselves; and a 
truer perspective in which science and technology will be 
seen in their rightful r d e s  as instruments or implements, 
not masters of these values.’’ This  clear understanding is in 
part  the object of this lecture. 
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111. REASON AND SCIENCE: T H E  DEGRADATION OF 
SCIENTIFIC DOGMA 
A 
Science, and man’s faith in science, are often supposed to 
be a wholly modern thing. Quite the opposite is, however, 
the case. I t  is the inheritance of a long history of Greek and 
Christian culture. Fo r  the Greek mind man’s reason was the 
reflection of the universal reason or logos in the world. Sci- 
ence or reason was thus the basis of a significant life. For 
the Christian this same logos was the reflection of the Di- 
vine mind. ‘iWhy,” asks St. Augustine, “should God disdain 
reason, his first-born son?” St. Augustine did not disdain it, 
nor did the entire Christian culture that followed. F o r  St. 
Thomas, reason and science were even the basis of religious 
faith and the great cosmologists, from Galileo to  Newton, 
all believed that their science was but a retracing of the 
footsteps of God in nature. 
T h e  story of man’s loss of faith in this ideal of reason- 
in this scientific dogma, as I shall call it-is too long to  tell 
in full. I t  is important, however, that we should note the 
high spots in that story in order that we may see the direc- 
tion in which our modern scientific culture has gone. 
I t  began, I think, precisely a t  the point a t  which science, 
in the exclusive modern sense, is supposed to  have begun- 
in the dictum of Francis Bacon that knowledge, or science, is 
power. Hitherto the object of science was to  understand; 
now its object is power and control-over both nature and 
man. T h e  divorce of knowledge and science from the moral 
and spiritual values was the first step in its degradation. A 
second important step was the so-called positivism of 
Auguste Comte, which, in one form o r  another, has come 
to dominate the science of the modern world. According to  
this view, there have been three stages of human culture, 
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the religious, the philosophical, and the scientific. T h e  first 
stage, it is held, is one of myth and superstition, the second, 
or philosophy, is the myth rationalized, the final stage is 
science, which not only surpasses the others but is eventually 
to  supersede them. According to  Comte, a science of human- 
ity, or what we now call the social sciences, would free man 
from all the illusions and superstitions of the past. 
A third step in this process of degradation was, however, 
still to  come. W e  may describe it as the pragmatism o r  in- 
strumentalism of the twentieth century. H e r e  the dictum 
that science is power, with which modern experimental sci- 
ence began, reaches its culmination. According to this con- 
ception of science, its object is no longer to  understand but 
t o  operate and control; science becomes identical with tech- 
nology. W h a t  men called the laws of nature are no longer 
viewed as the expressions of an objective reason o r  idea, 
but merely useful instruments for the manipulation of things 
in the interest of human desires. Physical science no longer 
retraces the footsteps of God in nature, but is concerned 
merely with manipulating a material nature which is itself 
essentially godless and irrational. Finally this notion has 
been applied to  man. M a n  is no longer an embodiment of 
reason, an end in himself, but a par t  of nature, to  be con- 
trolled like any other par t  of nature, for his own good, o r  
for  social and national good which transcends himself. 
B 
I have presented a picture of modern science which all of 
you will, I think, recognize. In one of his books Henry  
Adams speaks of the degradation of democratic dogma. I 
shall borrow the term from him and shall speak of the 
degradation of scientific dogma. T h e  two are not unrelated, 
as we shall later see, f o r  in the modern world science and 
democracy are related in a most intimate way. But for the 
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moment we shall speak of the degradation of scientific 
dogma. 
Tha t ,  despite its magnificent outward show and accom- 
plishment, there has been an inner degradation few of you 
would be disposed, I think, t o  deny. T h e  degradation of 
science consists, first of all, in the ignoble uses to  which it 
has been put. I do not mean merely its most obvious degra- 
dation-the control of the forces of nature for  vicious and 
destructive ends; I mean still more the employment of sci- 
ence for the manipulation and control of men. T h e  very 
term scientific propaganda is, to  my mind, a startling meas- 
ure of this disgrace. 
But  this use of science to ignoble ends is itself but an out- 
ward expression of an inner degradation of the ideal of 
science o r  knowledge itself. Instead of the traditional view 
of science as reason, we have finally reached a view accord- 
ing to which knowledge itself has no ultimate validity but 
is merely a useful instrument for the control of phenomena 
in the interest of life which is itself irrational. It is not too 
much to  say tha t  this vaunted rationality of science is based 
upon a fundamental irrationality. This is such an important 
part  of my entire argument that, a t  the risk of being over- 
technical, I must dwell upon the point for a moment. 
T h e  modern man had placed his faith in science. If 
knowledge is not the only good, it is the highest good. But 
suppose science, turning upon man and his knowledge, tells 
us that man’s reason is but a useful instrument to adapt the 
biological organism to  its environment-that truth itself is 
merely our name for such adaptation and control. Surely, 
as Ea r l  Balfour has said, science cuts off the very limb upon 
which it sits. This situation is but dimly felt by the man in 
the street, but it is increasingly felt by the scientist and 
philosopher. In thus completely naturalizing our intelligence 
we have denatured it, taken all the meaning out of it. 
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T h e  “rake’s progress” of modern science has been swift 
and certain. I t  began by the divorce of science from wisdom 
and from the moral and spiritual values the acknowledg- 
ment of which is implied in wisdom. This postulate of the 
independence of science passed then to  the dogma of the 
supremacy of science and its mastery over the ends and 
values of life. Finally, being thus divorced from reason in 
the larger sense, it ended in a philosophy of irrationalism 
and illusionism which includes science itself. Of the modern 
spirit it has been well said by a recent poet: 
I t  feels that  knowledge is the only good, 
Yet fears that science may confound it  quite, 
Changing what  yesterday seemed logical 
T o  something different and bitter overnight. 
I t  is this confounding of knowledge by science-this turning 
of science against its own principles and its own faith in 
objective reason in nature and in man, which marks, not 
only the final degradation of scientific dogma itself, but con- 
stitutes also the inner source of man’s disillusionment with 
science itself. 
T h e  historian Ferrero was fully aware of this situation. 
H e  tells us that here we have the great problem with which 
contemporary thought is confronted. Everything seems to 
totter and fall around man, who, by transcending all nat- 
ural limits, has become too powerful-transcendence of all 
natural limits-natural law in science and knowledge, nat- 
ural law in society and politics, absolute norms in logic and 
morals. Man  has become too powerful through a science 
divorced from these, but in this power he has lost all power 
over himself, for  he has exchanged the universal reason for 
the irrational will to  power. T h e  Victorian poet sang: 
Let  knowledge grow from more to more 
But more of reverence in us dwell. 
Knowledge, science, has indeed grown from more to more, 
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but the reverence has departed-the reverence, for God, for 
Nature and for Man-yes, even reverence for science itself. 
IV. SCIENCE AND M A N :  T H E  PROBLEM OF T H E  
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
A 
I t  is scarcely to  be wondered at ,  then, that everywhere 
scientists are themselves taking stock of this thing called 
science. Still less is it  to  be wondered a t  that the issues pre- 
sented should appear to  them under the question of Science 
and Man. For  it is, in fact, the last stage of this process of 
degradation that man who made science has done so only to  
become its slave. I t  is not surprising, then, that  science is 
asking anew the question, what is man?  
Only last year in this very place Professor E. G. Conklin 
gave a course of lectures on this title. And a few years be- 
fore the distinguished biologist, J. A. Thompson, wrote a 
book under the same title. I t  is not a mere coincidence that 
both the scientists who asked this question were biologists. 
F o r  it was modern biology under the aegis of Darwinism 
which first challenged the traditional view of man as de- 
veloped through the thousand years of Christian thought. 
I t  is only natural that, in the second thoughts about man 
which are now arising, it is the biologists that should raise 
the question. 
All the sciences of life and mind were profoundly affected 
by the publication in 1859 of Darwin’s Origin of Species 
and by the Descent of M a n  which followed in 1861. For  a 
time it seemed that all our ethical and social conceptions 
would be recast in the light of the new principles of evolu- 
tion and in view of the changed conception of man which 
the new knowledge brought with it. I t  was believed that for  
the first time we had come into possession of a really scien- 
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tific knowledge of man and of his place in the universe, and 
that upon that knowledge a really scientific view of human 
good could a t  last be erected. 
There  are two points a t  which evolutionary science has 
almost completely revolutionized our conception of man. 
In  the first place, it  has naturalized him by attempting to  
explain his intelligence and morals in terms of the irrational 
and amoral forces of natural selection and the struggle for 
existence. In the second place, it  has developed a purely 
naturalistic theory of human good o r  value which makes of 
his morals and values merely instruments of survival, o r  of 
satisfaction of natural desires and of the will t o  power. 
This complete naturalization of man-of his intelligence, 
his morals, and even of his religion-has been the main 
theme of the social sciences of the last half century. 
I t  is rarely realized how fa r  this naturalization of man 
has gone, o r  how insidiously it has transformed our entire 
conception of human rights and justice-transformed them 
from the r i l e  of ends in themselves to  that of mere instru- 
ments or means to social and national ends. Of this I shall 
speak more fully in the next lecture. A distinguished French 
AbbC, speaking of Darwinism as applied to  man, said this 
more than a half century ago. “ I t  matters little so long as 
these ideas are confined to  the intellectuals. But wait until 
they penetrate to  the mind of the masses and then see what 
you get.” They  have now sunk to  the level of the masses and 
become the ideologies of whole peoples, and we know well 
enough what we have got. Before the wholesale manipula- 
tion of men we stand aghast, but we have yet fully to  realize 
that it is this complete naturalization of man which forms 
the ideological basis for the political philosophies which we 
both fear and scorn. 
Is it to be wondered a t  that this situation has led to  seri- 
ous heart searchings among the social scientists and philoso- 
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phers themselves? T h a t  they should conduct symposiums on 
the subject of Science and Man,  and that they should be re- 
vising their notions about the sciences that deal with man? 
Certainly, a notable change is taking place in the intellectual 
climate and it is to  some of these changes that I wish now to  
call your attention. I believe them to be of great importance. 
B 
T h e  dominant idea of the Darwinian epoch was the 
dogma of the unity of science. Dazzled by the triumphs of 
the physical sciences, men believed that the methods of the 
sciences which deal with things could be carried over to  the 
sciences which deal with man. It followed from this con- 
ception that the ideal of science was to  reduce all phenomena 
to  their physical basis-mind, with its knowledge and mor- 
als, to  biological conceptions ; the biological to the chemical 
and the chemical to  the physical. This ideal of scientific 
method has been called reductionism-reduction of the com- 
plex to  the simple and of the higher to  the lower. 
I t  cannot be denied that much has been accomplished by 
this method. If you wish to  manipulate and control men as 
you would an animal o r  a thing, this is indeed the way to  go 
about it. Behavioristic and Freudian psychologies have 
scored their triumphs by this method. Only slowly did it 
dawn upon the scientist and philosopher that this does not 
give us knowledge of man but of that which is below man. 
Only slowly have they realized that to reduce man to  that 
which is below him is really to dehumanize him. Is it to  be 
wondered a t  that thus to  dehumanize man in the sphere of 
theory means ultimately to  dehumanize him in the sphere 
of practice also? T h a t  man’s inhumanity to man in his 
thoughts about his fellows should lead ultimately to in- 
humanity in his deeds ? 
In any case, this is what has really happened, and it is for 
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this reason also that  even scientists are concerned about this 
problem of science and man. There  is a strong reaction 
against this dogma of the unity of science and all that  it 
implies. Men speak of a decentralization of the sciences. 
T h e  oft-quoted saying of the social philosopher Dilthey may 
be taken as a symbol of this change of intellectual climate. 
“Nature,” he cries, “we explain; the soul we understand.” 
W e  do  not understand man by reducing him to nature. To  
explain him thus is to  explain him away. W e  understand him 
only in terms of the ends and values which make him man. 
T h e  science of man is not a science in the same sense as the 
physical sciences. T h e  material of the two types of science 
is so different that  the methods must be different also. This  
principle of decentralization was applied in the first place 
to  the science of history, of which we shall have more to  say 
in a later lecture. T h e  methods of history and of the social 
and political sciences bound up with history must be dis- 
tinguished completely from those of the natural sciences-a 
thesis which has found classical expression in Rickert’s book, 
T h e  Limits of the Physical Sciences. 
Now I am far  from asserting that this point of view has 
triumphed in the sciences of man. If it were so, I should not 
need to  emphasize the point as strongly as I do. But I do 
say that  more and more the representatives of the sciences 
which deal with man are  revising in many ways their con- 
ceptions of the nature of the social sciences. In  this connec- 
tion I am fond of an expression of Ernst  Troeltsch who 
represents this standpoint in the sphere of history. “More  
intelligent intercourse with the material of history,” he tells 
us, “has changed our notions of the method of history.’’ 
And this is true of the social sciences in general. 
In  a recent public address President Dodds of Princeton 
admitted that we must recognize that  political science is not 
science in the sense that many have supposed it to  be- 
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namely, with the objects and methods of the physical sci- 
ences. h4ore intelligent intercourse with the material of his 
subject has convinced him of this and he is fundamentally 
right. Our handling of the phenomena of the sciences of the 
human has been grossly unintelligent a t  points. W e  have 
even been guilty of the absurdity of bewailing the fact that 
these sciences have not approached the perfection of the 
physical sciences and that consequently, we cannot control 
man as we can nature. T h e  last thing in the world that we 
should want is to control men in this way. T h e  only intelli- 
gent purpose of the sciences of man is to  understand man 
and thus to bring about that self-control which follows from 
the free acknowledgment of the ends and values of society. 
Any other sort of control is in the end as futile as it is ab- 
horrent. 
C 
T h e  first half of the twentieth century will go down in 
history as the period in which men gradually became aware 
of the fallacies of the nineteenth. These fallacies are many, 
both practical and theoretical. T h e  results of our practical 
fallacies in economics and politics are becoming only too 
evident in the very fury with which these fallacies and illu- 
sions are revenging themselves in the magnificent irration- 
ality of war. But, after all, it is the theoretical fallacies 
which are most significant, for wherever you find fallacy in 
action you may be assured that it is but the outward sign of 
fallacies in theory. 
T h e  fallacies of Darwinian naturalism were early sensed, 
among others by T. H. Huxley, whose famous Romanes 
lecture, entitled Evolzition and Ethics, will go down as a 
classic in the story of the culture of modern Europe. It was, 
to be sure, little honored a t  the time, but his main conten- 
tions have become an essential part  of the critical social 
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science and philosophy of our day. Professor G. E. Moore 
of Cambridge has embodied them in his famous formulation 
of the naturalistic fallacy.  T h e  understanding of this fallacy 
is so important for all that follows that I must try to make 
it quite clear. 
T h e  naturalistic fallacy is one which inevitably follows 
from the dogma of the unity of science and its implied re- 
ductionism. I t  consists in supposing that the values by which 
man, as man, lives can be deduced from a nature, which, as 
it is conceived by modern science, has no values: that we 
can get the rational from the non-rational, the moral from 
the non-moral, the “ought” from the “is.” It is, as Professor 
Moore points out, the fallacy particularly evident in modern 
evolutionism. 
T h e  fallacy does not, of course, arise in connection with 
the so-called physical sciences such as physics and chemistry. 
No one would seriously suppose for  a moment that the 
nature of human good could be deduced from these. I t  is 
only when we come to the biological sciences that there is a 
direct reference to  the human and that any inferences as to  
human values could conceivably be drawn. Now the only 
conception of biological value, or biological purpose, that  
could conceivably be extracted from the facts of this sci- 
ence-whether for the individual or the species-is suste- 
nance for as long as possible for as great numbers as pos- 
sible. T h e  creature by filling his skin gets a better skin to 
fill. But surely unless we assume that mere persistence in 
being, mere biological life, is itself an absolute value, there 
is no possibility of deducing man’s good from animal good, 
no possibility of deducing man’s moral values from a con- 
ception of value, as mere survival, which is essentially 
amoral. Man, to be man, must live by values higher than 
any deducible from nature in this sense. If we are to  deduce 
them from nature they must be wholly different from those 
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developed in our Western Christian civilization, as N e .  
tzsche clearly saw. 
D 
I t  is easy to  be misunderstood here and I wish if possible 
to avoid misunderstanding. Surely, it  will be said, you are 
not telling us that scientists and philosophers are now deny- 
ing the truth of biological science and evolution. Surely you 
yourself are not denying that man-this reasoning and valu- 
ing man of whom you are speaking-did actually evolve by 
natural processes from anthropoid ancestry. This is not 
seriously disputed even by those whose deepest feelings are 
opposed to  such admission. 
Certainly I am not denying these facts, in so fa r  as they 
are facts. Still less am I suggesting that modern social sci- 
ence disputes these facts. W h a t  I am denying-and what 
much of modern thought is coming to  see must be denied- 
is this complete naturalization of man, of his intelligence 
and his morals, which men have thought to be the necessary 
consequences of these facts. Wha t  I am denying is that the 
values by which man, as man, lives can be deduced from 
these facts of biological nature. In  other words, I am main- 
taining that man, who has emerged from nature, transcends 
nature. Tha t ,  in Emerson’s words, there is one law for things 
and another law for man. T h e  laws for man cannot be re- 
duced to  the laws of nature without fallacies which, while in 
the first instance theoretical, end in being practical also. 
I am not denying the facts of biological evolution, but 
simply maintaining that transcendentalism of man and his 
values which has been the central contention of our entire 
European religion and philosophy and which found its 
modern expression in the critical idealism of Kant. This, I 
believe, no developments of modern science, when rightly 
understood and appraised, have in the least affected. In any 
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case, it  is the conception of man with which our entire demo- 
cratic dogma is bound up and without which it has no logi- 
cal foundations. 
But, to return to the naturalistic fallacy of which we have 
been speaking, I cannot help feeling that a large part  of 
social science since Darwin and Spencer is a magnificent ex- 
ploitation of this naturalistic fallacy. I t  was Nietzsche who 
made this clearest to me personally. Of the British social 
and moral philosophers of the last century he said that they 
were either knaves or fools. They tried to graft  on this 
biological naturalism the moral values of Greek and Chris- 
tian civilization which rest on different premises and upon 
an entirely different view of man. Either they were really 
conscious that this could not be done-in which case they 
were knaves; or they had not intelligence enough to see that 
it could not be done-in which case they were fools. 
This is strong language but surely this is a place where 
strung language should be used. Surely we have but to look 
the facts fairly in the face to  realize that no language is too 
strong. Granted that our human ways of life were the prod- 
ucts of what we call natural selection; granted that our in- 
telligence and our morals were made by nature for a natural 
object; certainly they have developed along lines which are 
independent of selection, perhaps in opposition to it. As the 
late Ear l  Balfour has said: “NO evolutionary explanation 
can bridge the interval between nature and man. If we treat 
the Sermon on the Mount as a naturalistic product it is as 
much an evolutionary accident as Hamlet and the Ninth 
Symphony.” 
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V. SCIENCE AND VALUE : INSTRUMENTALISM IN T H E  
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
A 
T h e  standing problem of modern philosophy, writes John 
Dewey, is the problem of science and value, or, as he puts it, 
“the relation of science to  the things we love and prize.” 
After what has gone before we must, I think, all agree with 
him. For  him, as for many representatives of the social 
sciences, this problem is to be solved, however, by the appli- 
cation of the operational and instrumentalist conception of 
science to  our moral and political values. Earlier in this 
lecture I spoke of the degradation of scientific dogma and of 
the instrumentalism as the last stage of the process. It is 
when this instrumentalism is applied to  man and to  our hu- 
man values that, as I maintain, the full implications of the 
position finally appear. 
T h e  argument runs as follows. T h e  physical sciences, we 
are told, have abandoned the ancient scientific dogma of ab- 
solute knowledge of an antecedent rational world-order and 
substituted for it the purely instrumentalist conception of 
control of process through experiment. Le t  us now, it is 
argued, carry this notion over to the material of the social 
and moral sciences and to the judgments of value which 
they contain. Values, in other words, like everything else, 
are to be tested by experiment, either actual or in thought. 
Thus the past of any value is to  be used just as in any labo- 
ratory experiment. W e  neither glorify it nor condemn it. I t  
is merely to  be interpreted according to the special problem 
created by the specific situation. When we operate with 
values in this way we shall, just as in the physical sciences, 
achieve, not certainty, but control. And this is all that any 
sensible person should wish. 
Now I shall not argue against Professor Dewey’s posi- 
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tion as a whole. T h a t  would involve more scientific and 
philosophical technicalities than are either desirable or pos- 
sible in a lecture such as this. N o r  shall I attempt to refute 
the view of science and scientific method involved, although 
it represents, I believe, the essential degradation of scien- 
tific dogma of which I have spoken. N o r  shall I raise the 
question whether, even if  this conception of science were 
sound, the method of the physical sciences could be thus car- 
ried over analogously to  the social sciences. I do not think 
it can, as my discussion of the principle of the decentraliza- 
tion of the social sciences has indicated. I shall confine my- 
self to  an examination of this operational method as applied 
to human values in order to  see how it works out. 
On the face of it the argument of an analogous instru- 
mental test for human values seems cogent. But it is sur- 
prising how many difficulties immediately appear. 
H o w  do  we, in the first place, test the success of a value? 
Values undeniably “work.” W e  have monogamy, bigamy, 
polyandry, and a dozen other systems of marriage. They  
have all worked, since people seem to have lived and sung 
under each of them. Taboo against murder works, since 
societies flourish where the taboo is present; a systematic 
killing of aged parents also works. T h e  latter custom is 
even necessary where food is scarce and existence hard ;  per- 
haps to that extent it has even a pragmatic value. But be- 
cause these various ways of life work, they do not necessa- 
rily succeed o r  fail. T o  determine the success o r  failure in 
any ultimate sense we must first know what the ends of man 
ultimately are, in other words, what are the intrinsic human 
values. 
It may be admitted, then, that  up to  a point the instru- 
mentalist conception enables us to  explain, but it gives us no 
criterion of evaluation. This is immediately evident when 
we attempt a revaluation of values, when, in other words, we 
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attempt to  pass to  the judgment of new values (economic, 
social and political) which are proposed-when for instance 
we wish to pass judgment upon the new forms of life, the 
new orders,” as they are called, which men are now pro- 
posing to us. 
When judging the workability, the effectiveness of a 
value, we have to  use some other value to appraise it. W e  
may know the processes by which people are made fat ,  
lean, o r  middling; but we shall have to  decide whether we 
ought to make them fat ,  lean, or middling. Suppose then 
we decide to  make them lean in order that they may run 
faster. Then  we have founded our value of leanness upon 
the value of speed in running, which must in turn be founded 
on another value, and so on. Where then are our key value 
or values? By the method proposed there could obviously 
be no key value in the sense of its antecedent existence, an 
existence which we must mutually acknowledge if we are to  
make any intelligible judgment. This  point is all-important. 
There  is no judgment inherent in mere process. Somewhere, 
sometime, we must come upon end o r  key values-absolutes 
which alone can give meaning and validity to  our instru- 
mental judgments. I t  is only by something that transcends 
process that process itself can be either understood or 
judged. This our entire European culture has, until the 
most recent times, fully understood. From Plato and Aris- 
totle, through the whole of Christian and Western philos- 
ophy, this has been fundamental. I t  is, indeed, par t  of the 
rationality of scientific dogma. It is here also, as we shall 
see, that the entire doctrine of natural and inalienable rights 
finally rests. 
Instrumentalism is powerless to  give us light on ultimate 
moral and political issues and is surely powerless before the 
issues which face man today. And need I add that the social 
sciences that employ it have nothing to  say on these ultimate 
L i  
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issues? If they suppose that they have they are deceiving 
both themselves and us. Oh, I know, of course, how such 
an argument is usually turned aside. I n  popular circles an 
appeal is always made to  “all intelligent, right-minded, and 
forward looking people.’’ But who are these people and 
how do  we know that they are intelligent and right-minded 
regarding human values? Surely only i f  we know what these 
ultimate intrinsic values are. And such knowledge the instru- 
mentalist cannot give us. 
Need I labor my point? Surely it is obvious. But it is not 
so obvious how significant it is in the situation in which we 
find ourselves today. W e  set the democratic values and the 
democratic way of life over against the anti-democratic Val- 
ues of the totalitarian philosophies. But how do we know 
that ours are the genuine values? H o w  do we know, from 
a purely experimental point of view, but that our values will 
no longer work, and that the values of Blzit und Boden rep- 
resent “the wave of the future?” H o w  do we know that the 
so-called humane values of democracy are not, as Nietzsche 
insisted, decadent values? H o w  do we know that, as Mr .  
Russell maintains, freedom, if not the highest good, is cer- 
tainly the highest political good? Granted that we know the 
processes by which men are made according to  certain polit- 
ical patterns, how do  we know the truth and value of these 
patterns, whether democratic, fascist, or national socialist? 
All we can say, on the assumptions of the instrumentalist, is 
this: “I do not like you Mr. Fell, the reasons why I cannot 
tell.” Oh, there will be reasons of a certain kind-and some 
of them will be rationalizations-but as to any ultimate 
reasons, the very premises of instrumentalism exclude them. 
B 
Here  again, it  is easy to  be misunderstood and I would, 
if possible, avoid misunderstanding. This is no attack on 
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Professor Dewey, either as a noble democrat or as an Amer- 
ican publicist whom we all delight to  honor. In these re- 
spects he is in many ways our first citizen. I wish merely to  
point out that the very qualities which we honor in him come 
not from his instrumentalist philosophy but from certain 
fundamental dogmas by which he, as well as his New Eng- 
land ancestors, has lived. N o r  do  I deny an important rela- 
tion of science to  values; I am merely seeking the right rela- 
tion. Professor Conklin, to whose lectures I have referred, 
has something to  say on this point and comment on his 
words may help to  make my own position clear. 
“ I t  is often said,” he writes, “that science has nothing to  
do with values; one might as well say that intelligence and 
reason have no relation to values. W h a t  are values but 
means and measures of satisfaction? It is impossible for a 
scientist, o r  any one accustomed to  deal with evidence or to  
face reality, t o  appreciate the statement that  science has 
nothing to do with values. I t  has certainly created innumer- 
able conveniences and comforts, it has controlled diseases 
and pestilences, relieved suffering, prolonged life. I t  has 
destroyed horrible superstitions. . . .” “In all these re- 
spects,” he concludes, “the ethics of science does not differ 
from the ethics of Christianity.” 
W e  are familiar enough with this line of thought, so 
characteristic of the nineteenth century. All this science has 
indeed done, but it has often done equally evil things. T h e  
best that me can say is that  it is neutral. As to  the identity 
of the ethics of science with the ethics of Christianity, I wish 
it were so, but the facts are otherwise. T h e  plain truth is 
that science, as conceived in the modern world, has no ethics; 
the best we can say is that it is amoral. Science and scien- 
tific method, in the modern sense, can determine merely 
means to ends, never the ends themselves, merely what we 
call instrumental values, never the intrinsic values which 
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these instrumental values presuppose. It is high time that 
we learned this fundamental truth. 
VI. T H E  FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA OF T H E  
MODERN MIND 
A 
At  the beginning of this lecture I spoke of the strange 
contradictions which permeate our entire culture, our sci- 
ence and our philosophy, our literature and our art ,  contra- 
dictions which are  everywhere recognized as constituting 
the crisis of the modern world. This crisis is epitomized 
for  us in the issue presented by the topic of this lecture, 
Science and M a n .  Modern man has been faced by a dilemma, 
one of the cruelest dilemmas upon which the human spirit 
has ever been impaled. Wha t  is this man of whom humani- 
tarians prate and to  whom the politicians appeal? Wha t  is 
man of whom, as the psalmist supposed, “God is so mind- 
ful?” 
I think you will find that  there are only two possible an- 
swers to this question, one of which must in the last analysis 
be chosen. There is no middle ground. Either man is but 
a par t  of nature or  he transcends nature. In  the first case, 
his intelligence and his morals, his science and his philosophy 
are  mere temporal adaptations to  his environment and have 
no more significance and validity than that. Or, on the 
other hand, he transcends nature, in which case his reason 
and his values, his science and his morals, get their signifi- 
cance and validity from that  which is above him-from the 
“transcendentals,” as the great philosopher St. Thomas 
called them, absolute truth, goodness, and beauty. There  
may be a middle ground but I have yet to  find it. Certainly 
it is not to be found in the new naturalism of which men 
speak. 
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This is the great, the tremendous, question which lies a t  
the heart of all our confusion and distress. W e  are trying 
to  decide whether we are sons of God or merely high-grade 
simians. This indecision of the modern man did not a t  first 
seem to  trouble us but it is now beginning to get under our 
skins. W e  are finding it increasingly difficult to talk about 
freedom and justice, about all ideals and values-even the 
truth of science itself-without sticking our tongues in our 
cheeks. ,411 such talk sounds ridiculous in the mouths of 
high-grade simians. 
I have presented this dilemma not in order to  indulge in 
intellectual fireworks-this is a childish pastime. Nor  yet 
in order to coerce your thought-I probably could not do so 
if I wished-but rather because it is precisely to this dilemma 
that we are led i f ,  as philosophers, we think stubbornly 
about fundamental things. 
Does this alternative embarrass you? This logical em- 
barrassment is nothing, I assure you, compared with the 
actual embarrassment which confronts the practical world 
today. For  it is a condition, not a theory, that faces us. T h e  
rival ideologies, as we call them, which dominate the politi- 
cal world today embody this alternative. Both national so- 
cialism and communism accept this purely naturalistic con- 
ception of man, avow it openly, and build all their pro- 
cedures, both theoretical and practical, upon it. Shall we 
then say that the ideology of democracy, with its dogmas of 
natural rights and absolute justice, embodies the alternative 
conception of man?  I wish it were possible to  answer with 
an absolute affirmative. This democratic dogma, it is true, 
rests, in the last analysis, upon the transcendental conception 
of man, but there has been a steady degradation of this 
dogma also, as we shall see in the following lecture. 
Enough here that we understand fully what the problem of 
science and man means in the modern world. 
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B 
I have no apologies to make for this long-and as it may 
seem to some of you-abstract and over-technical discus- 
sion. Nor  have I any apologies to make for the forthright 
and-as it may also seem to some-dogmatic way in which I 
have sought to  present the issue. Clear thinking demands 
plain speaking and now, if ever in the long story of man- 
kind, both are needed. 
“Science and Man” is, as I have sought to show, the cen- 
tral problem of the modern world. From it flow all the 
other problems which will be discussed in the lectures to 
come. In  concluding this initial lecture we may properly re- 
turn to that symposium upon this first topic and take as our 
final word a summary of its conclusions as expressed in the 
preface. “Nineteenth century scientific materialism,” we 
are told, Liclosed the mind of man to  what is above him. 
Twentieth century psychology opened the mind of man to 
what is below him. Wha t  is essential now is the awaking of 
man’s consciousness to  what is above, beneath, around and 
within him.” 
Few of us would, I think, disagree with this general con- 
clusion. But such an awakening certainly cannot come from 
science as now understood. If science is to lead us to  such 
understanding it must be science in the ancient and honor- 
able sense. Do not misunderstand me. I, for one, believe 
that faith in the primacy of reason and in freedom through 
science is an essential part of our entire democratic dogma. 
But I also believe that this very faith in freedom through 
reason and science has itself been endangered by certain de- 
velopments in modern science itself. I t  is this danger that 
I have sought to  point out. The  illusion that freedom is to 
be achieved through scientific invention and that automatic 
progress is certain through technology, has been largely 
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dispelled. T h e  danger is that with the loss of our illusions 
we may lose our faith also. 
Corruptio optiini pessima. It is only when the best is 
perverted that we get the worst. It is the corruption of the 
noble scientific dogma with which our Western European 
culture started that has given rise to  the corruptions within 
that culture itself. It is the divorce of science from wisdom, 
and from the moral and spiritual values implied by wisdom, 
which has generated the contradictions and excesses which 
have marked the last stages of scientific development. It is 
finally the identification of knowledge with power and all 
that this involves which threatens to make of science itself a 
frightful Molloch which will end in devouring its own chil- 
dren. 
